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Abstract
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal cor-
ruption in a static framework. We prove that the relationship between the tax
rate and tax revenues depends on the relevance of the “shame effect” of being
detected in a corrupt transaction. In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax
revenues grow as the tax rate increases. Moreover, there is a critical tax rate
where the growth rate of tax revenues begins to reduce. In countries with a
high “shame effect” tax revenues increase up to a threshold value and then
decrease.
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion and fiscal corruption have been a general and persistent problem through-
out history with serious economic consequences, not only in transition economies, but
also in countries with developed tax systems. Generally, corruption and evasion are
two distinct phenomena, which can exist independently. But when tax authorities
are dealing with the possibility of corruption they should consider the possibility of
taxpayers who under–report their income bribing tax inspectors. It is widely agreed
that tax evasion and corruption have several detrimental effects on the economy. The
loss of tax revenues can, in fact, imply a reduction in public services; in addition, tax
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evasion and corruption can seriously harm economic growth (amongst others, Rose
- Akerman, 1975, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) and distort income distribution
as individuals and firms may have different opportunities for evasion (Hindriks et
al.,1999). Although there is extensive literature investigating the origins, effects and
extent of evasion and corruption from both theoretical and empirical points of view,
interaction between tax evasion and corruption has only been partially explored. It
is, in fact, only recently that this relationship has been investigated in the literature.
Although tax evasion can exist without corruption and corruption can exist without
tax evasion, since bribery agreements can reduce deterrence of violation, the interac-
tion between evasion and fiscal corruption is a relevant economic phenomenon when
analyzing the behaviour of tax revenues.
In the pioneering model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the relationship between
tax rates and evasion is ambiguous and depends on the utility function. A broader
review of the literature reports more generally, that theoretical predictions of the ef-
fect of tax rates on evasion are dependent on the assumptions of the model (Slemrod
and Yitzhaki, 2000). Fisman and Wei (2000) present a case study of tax evasion in
China: they find that, on average, a 1–percent increase in the tax rate leads to a
3–percent increase in evasion and, furthermore, this relationship is not linear: the
evasion elasticity is larger at a high tax rate.
Chander and Wilde (1992) take into account the possibility of collusion between a tax
evader and an official auditor whose cost of dishonesty is (relatively) low. Besley and
McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Mookherjee and Png (1995), deal with
the issue of optimal remuneration of inspectors. Besley and McLaren (1993) compare
three distinct remuneration schemes, which provide different incentives to inspectors:
efficiency wages, reservation wages and capitulation wages. They characterize the
conditions under which each scheme generates the greatest amount of tax revenues,
net of administration costs. They show that the efficiency wage strategy may not be
a good idea most of the time. In contrast, in our model, we do not consider the issue
of optimal remuneration of inspectors as we assume that the inspector is paid a fixed
wage. Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a model where all the actors are dishonest.
They allow, however, for general remuneration schemes and, more importantly, for
extortion. They show that, as well as losses in tax collection, the more bribes are col-
lected, the more a tax inspector can resort to extortion in order to collect even more.
In this case, the authors show that distributional effects of evasion and corruption
are regressive, because the richest taxpayers have most to gain from evading taxes
and are least vulnerable to extortion (as it is harder to credibly over–report their
income). Finally, Mookherjee and Png (1995) also consider only corruptible agents,
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although they remove the exogenous matching of the auditor and the evader, which
is often–assumed in the literature. They consider it a moral hazard problem since the
inspector has to exert a costly non–observable effort for evasion to be disclosed.
All the models described analyze the relationship between tax revenues and the tax
rate, and some of them (see Chander and Wilde, 1992 and Sanyal et al., 2000) show,
as does our model, that there may be a possibility that an increase in the tax rate
could actually decrease government revenues.
Our paper provides a study of the behaviour of fiscal revenues beyond where there
is corruption, as we also consider the relevance of the “shame effect” linked to the
possibility of the entrepreneur being detected and reported in a corrupt transaction.
When bureaucracy is corrupt, a rise in tax rates starts off complicated strategic moves
on the part of both taxpayers and inspectors. In a corrupt administration, in fact,
a higher tax rate can represent the possibility of a higher negotiated bribe rate: this
may increase the number of corrupt tax inspectors by overcoming the “shame” cost,
while for taxpayers, a higher tax rate creates a greater incentive to pay bribes.
In our model, we demonstrate that the relationship between the tax rate and tax
collection depends on the relevance of the “shame effect”. In details, if the State
wants to maximize tax revenues in a “low shame” country, it has to set a tax rate
greater than a threshold value, because up to this value, the tax revenues increase
- as the tax rate increases - at an increasing rate; in a “high shame” country, the
State should set a tax rate equal to a threshold value because this value is a global
maximum of tax revenues with respect to t. In both cases, there is fiscal corruption
in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, describe the tim-
ing of the game and present the results. In Section 3 we discuss policy considerations.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good y. The economy is com-
posed of three players: controllers, tax inspectors and entrepreneurs. Tax inspectors
cannot invest in the production activity and earn a fixed salary w. Entrepreneurs use
their available capital in the production sector. The State monitors entrepreneurs’
and tax inspectors’ behavior through controllers, in order to weed out or reduce cor-
ruption, and fixes the level of the tax rate t on the product y. The State uses its tax
revenues to pay the tax inspectors’ wages, and there is no space for financing public
productive expenditure. We assume that taxation is not distorstive regarding input
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provision. Entrepreneurs produce y, with technology with constant returns to scale.
Each entrepreneur is assumed below to have the same quantity of capital k. The
production function of the good only depends on the capital and the natural state
that may occur. Indeed with a probability (1 − δ) production will be y = ak, while
with a probability δ an adverse natural state will occur, production will not take
place and the corresponding production will be y = 0. The tax inspector, who checks
whether the tax payment is correct, is able to tell which of the two natural states
have occurred for each entrepreneur. It is common knowledge that the tax inspector1
is corruptible, in the sense that he pursues his own interest and not necessarily that
of the State; in other words, the tax inspector is open to bribery. The tax inspector,
in the case of the “good” natural state and in exchange for a bribe b, can offer the
entrepreneur the opportunity of reporting that the “bad” natural state has arisen. In
this case, the entrepreneur could refuse to pay the bribe (bd being the bribe requested
by the tax inspector), or agree to pay the bribe and negotiate the amount with the
inspector.
The State checks on the behavior of entrepreneurs and tax inspectors. Let q ∈ [0, 1]
be the exogenous monitoring level implemented by the State; then q is the probability
of being detected, given that corruption has taken place. The entrepreneurs incur a
punishment equal to ck where c ∈ [0, 1].2 We assume that the entrepreneurs are not
homogeneous agents, and more precisely, the j-th entrepreneur attributes a subjective
value cjk to the objective punishment – depending on his own “shame effect” – when
the corrupt transaction is detected. The entrepreneur, if detected, must pay taxes ty,
reputation cost cj, but he is refunded the cost of the bribe paid to the tax inspector
3.
2.1 The game: description and solution
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be formalized by the
following two-period game.
In what follows, we refer to the entrepreneur payoff by a superscript (1) and to the
1The inspector is assumed to have monopolistic power, meaning that an entrepreneur is seen by
only one inspector and cannot turn to other inspectors to be treated differently.
2The punishment for the entrepreneur is not a constant, but rather a function of the investment.
In this case too, based on the statements of Rose - Ackerman (1999): “On the other side of the
corrupt transaction, a fixed penalty levied on bribers will lower both the demand for corrupt services
and the level of bribes. However, it will have no marginal impact once the briber passes the corruption
threshold. To have a marginal effect, the penalties imposed on bribe payers should be tied to their
gains (their excess profits, for example)”. pp. 55.
3This assumption can be more easily understood when there is extortion by the tax inspector
rather than corruption.
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inspector payoff by a superscript (2): they represent respectively the first and the
second element of the payoff vector pii, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
At the outset of the game, Nature decides in which state the entrepreneurs find
themselves with their consequent level of activity.
(1) In the first stage of the game, the tax inspector checks the entrepreneurs’ pro-
duction. If a “bad” natural state occurs, then the tax inspector reports that
no tax is owed and in this case, the game ends. Otherwise, if there is a “good”
natural state, the tax inspector decides whether to ask for the bribe bd and to
report that the “bad” natural state has arisen, and that the entrepreneur need
not pay any tax.
(1.1) If bd = 0 no bribe is asked for, the payoff vector for the entrepreneurs and
tax inspectors is:
pi2 = (ak(1− t), w) (1)
The game ends in the equilibrium without corruption.
(1.2) Otherwise, let bd > 0 be the positive bribe asked for by the tax inspector,
the game continues to stage two.
(2) At stage two the entrepreneur decides whether to negotiate the bribe or turn it
down.
(2.1) If the entrepreneur refuses the bribe, then the payoff vector is given by:
pi3 = (ak(1− t), w) (2)
Then in this case, the game ends. There is no penalty for the tax inspector.
(2.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts and the two parties will find the bribe
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game (bNB) so the game
ends. This bribe is the outcome of a negotiation between the inspector and
the entrepreneur, who will be assumed to share a given surplus. The payoffs
will depend on whether the inspector and the entrepreneur are detected
(with probability q) or not detected (with probability (1 − q)). There is
no penalty for the tax inspector who is detected.4
If the entrepreneur decides to pay the bribe, the expected payoff vector is
given by:
pi4 = (ak(1− qt)− cjkq − (1− q)b, w + (1− q)b) (3)
4The results do not depend on the existence of a cost for the tax inspector who is corrupted and
detected.
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The game ends in the equilibrium with corruption and evasion.
We first determine the equilibrium bribe bNB5.
Proposition 2.1. Let q 6= 1.6 Then there exists a unique non negative bribe (bNB),
as the Nash solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNB = µ
[
akt− qkcj
(1− q)
]
. (4)
where µ ≡ ε
ε+β
is the share of the surplus that goes to the tax inspector and β and ε
are the parameters that can be interpreted as the bargaining strength measures of the
entrepreneur and the tax inspector respectively.
As a consequence of the model, if we assume that the tax inspector and the en-
trepreneur share the surplus on an equal basis, then we arrived at the standard Nash
case, when ε = β = 1. In this case the bribe is:
bNB =
akt
2
− qkcj
2(1− q) . (5)
In other words, the bribe represents 50 percent of the saving which comes from not
paying taxes, net of reputation cost for the entrepreneur, if he is found out.
We will refer hereafter to the symmetry of the standard Nash bribe and study explic-
itly our problem for µ = 1
2
7.
The payoff vector is given by:
pi4 =
(
ak − akt(1 + q)
2
− cjkq
2
, w +
akt(1− q)
2
− cjqk
2
)
(6)
We now discuss the behavior of the equilibrium bribe in (5) with respect to the tax
rate and monitoring level.
(1) Bribe vs tax rate. By analyzing this derivative we observe that:
∂bNB
∂t
=
ak
2
> 0 (7)
5See Appendix A for the proof.
6If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
7In an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the surplus is shared unequally between the tax
inspector and the taxpayer and thus the bribe paid to the inspector increases as the inspector’s
bargaining strength increases, expressed as ε. In fact, by computing this derivative we observe that:
∂bNB
∂µ
= akt− qkc
(1− q) > 0.
Increasing the bargaining power of the tax inspector increases the bribe which he can obtain.
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Therefore, increasing the tax rate also increases the potential surplus that the
tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus increasing the bribe;
(2) Bribe vs monitoring level. In this case, we have:
∂bNB
∂q
= − kcj
2(1− q)2 < 0 (8)
Therefore, increasing monitoring reduces the potential surplus that the tax in-
spector and entrepreneur can share, thus reducing the bribe.
By solving the static game, we can prove the following proposition:8
Proposition 2.2. Let 0 ≤ qcj
a(1−q) = t
∗ ≤ 1.9 Then,
(a) if t ∈ [0, t∗) the j-th entrepreneur will find it worthwhile to be honest and then
the game ends with the payoff vector:
pi2 = (ak(1− t), w).
(b) if t ∈ [t∗, 1] the j-th entrepreneur will find it worthwhile to be corrupt and then
the game ends with the payoff vector:
pi4 =
(
ak − akt(1 + q)
2
− cjkq
2
, w +
akt(1− q)
2
− cjqk
2
)
.
Depending on the value of the tax rate t, two sub–game perfect Nash equilibria can
be found:
• If t < t∗, what the entrepreneur obtains by evading taxes is not enough to make
up for his own expected reputation cost. With this in mind, the tax inspector
will not ask the entrepreneur for a bribe. The game, therefore, finishes with
the entrepreneur paying taxes. There is no sufficient margin for agreeing on a
positive bribe with the tax inspector;
• If t ≥ t∗, the entrepreneur finds it worthwhile to start a negotiation with the
tax inspector. Thus the surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur and
the inspector will keep a negotiation going, the outcome of which is the bribe
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game.
8See Appendix B for the proof.
9We are assuming that qcj ≤ a(1−q) that is, the cost of corruption expected by the entrepreneur
is lower than the relevant benefits expected.
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In order to extend these considerations, we also analyze the solution of the game with
respect to reputation cost cj. Define
c∗ :=
at(1− q)
q
. (9)
If t ≥ t∗, then cj ≤ c∗; if t < t∗, then cj > c∗. c∗ is assumed to be an honesty threshold.
Moreover, since by definition c∗ ∈ [0, 1], then there exists a minimal threshold for the
monitoring activity
q◦ :=
at
at+ 1
(10)
such that q ≥ q◦. Thus, the honesty threshold c∗ is well defined when the monitoring
level is great enough. We will suppose q ≥ q◦ in the remaining part of the paper.
Tax revenues depend on the hypothesis made about the distributional cost: if the
specific j-th reputation cost is lower than c∗, the entrepreneur finds it worthwhile to
evade all taxes; vice versa, if the j-th entrepreneur’s reputation cost is greater than
c∗ then the entrepreneur will be honest.
The cumulative density of probability defines the distribution of individual costs
F (cj), where j is the specific entrepreneur. We assume that the distribution of en-
trepreneurs’ costs is of the Kumaraswamy type with real parameters α1 and α2. This
choice is driven by two facts: first of all, the Kuramaswamy distribution belongs to
the huge family of two–parameter probability laws. Thus, the choice of the Kura-
maswamy distribution is not restrictive. Moreover, and differently from the other
two–parameter distributions (the most famous being Beta distribution) we have an
explicit formula for the cumulative density function and thus mathematical tractabil-
ity.
The cumulative density function for the costs is:
F (cj) =
∫ cj
0
α1α2c
α1−1(1− cα1−1)α2−1dc = 1− (1− cα1j )α2 . (11)
Heterogeneity imposes that every entrepreneur will have a different reputation cost
cj, and the entrepreneur’s behavior is assumed to be influenced by his own cost cj, as
evidence suggests.
The fraction of corrupted entrepreneurs i.e. with a shame cost cj ≤ c∗ is given by
F (c∗) = 1− (1− (c∗)α1)α2 (12)
Analogously, we have that
1− F (c∗) = (1− (c∗)α1)α2 (13)
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is the fraction of honest entrepreneurs, i.e. with a shame cost cj > c
∗.
Substituting (9) in (12) and (13), we obtain the fraction of corrupted and honest
entrepreneurs respectively:
F (c∗) = 1−
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2
and
1− F (c∗) =
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2
We can analyze the behavior of corruption (takes as the number of corrupt en-
trepreneurs) with respect to the tax rate and monitoring level.
(1) Corruption vs tax rate. By analyzing this derivative we observe that, if α2 > 1,
then:
∂F (c∗)
∂t
=
α1α2a(1− q)
q
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2−1(at(1− q)
q
)α1−1
> 0. (14)
Therefore, increasing the tax rate also increases the potential surplus that the
tax inspector and entrepreneur can share, thus increasing corruption, irrespec-
tive of the specific distribution of shame cost;
(2) Corruption vs monitoring level. In this case, if α2 > 1, then:
∂F (c∗)
∂q
= −α1α2at
q2
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2−1(at(1− q)
q
)α1−1
< 0. (15)
Therefore, increasing monitoring reduces the potential surplus that the tax in-
spector and entrepreneur can share, thus reducing corruption.
We also notice that corruption does not depend on the distribution of the surplus
between the inspector and the tax evader, but only on the amount of the surplus τ .
On an aggregate level, the tax revenues, with a tax rate fixed at t, will be equal to the
tax paid by those who find themselves in a positive natural state (with probability
(1 − δ)) and who have a reputation cost which leads them to be honest, and those
who are corrupt, but are discovered in the act of corruption:
E(t, q) = atk[1− (1− (c∗)α1)α2 ](1− δ)q + atk(1− (c∗)α1)α2(1− δ). (16)
The presence of the reputation costs in (16) and of an honesty threshold c∗ allows us
to distinguish honest entrepreneurs, who pay taxes, from the others.10
10If t = 1, then it is reasonable to suppose that all entrepreneurs are corrupt, independently on
the reputation cost threshold c∗. In this case the tax revenues are paid only by those entrepreneurs
who have been found out: E(1) = (1− δ)akq.
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By substituting c∗ with its expression in (9), a straightforward computation allows
us to rewrite E(t, q) in (16) as follows:
E(t, q) = (1− δ)atk
{
q − (q − 1)
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2}
. (17)
2.2 Comparative statics
We would now like to provide a sensitivity analysis of E with respect to t and q.
We perform a numerical analysis of the behavior of E with respect to t and q, in
order to avoid the complexity of the closed form results and propose a more intuitive
description of the real situation.
We set δ = 0.5, k = 1, three different values for the capital productivity parameter:
a = 0.5; 1; 2, and three different distributions of the reputation costs (α1 = α2 = 2;
α1 = 2 and α2 = 5; α1 = 5 and α2 = 2). When α1 = α2 = 2, we have symmetry
among the agents with respect to the reputation costs; if α1 = 5 and α2 = 2, then we
observe asymmetry on the right–hand side of the distribution curve, which means a
high level of reputation costs and describes populations with a “high shame effect”;
the case α1 = 2 and α2 = 5 is the converse: the asymmetry is on the left–hand side
of the distribution curve, and we have populations with a “low shame effect”.
Generally, ceteris paribus, we observe three effects of the tax rate on tax revenues:
(1) as the tax rate increases, revenues increase, because those who are still honest
pay more taxes;
(2) as the tax rate increases, the number of honest entrepreneurs decreases and thus
revenues go down. Moreover, the number of corrupted entrepreneurs increases
and the number of undiscovered entrepreneurs grows;
(3) as the tax rate increases, revenues from entrepreneurs discovered in corrupt
transactions increase.
As we can observe (see Figures 1-2), some considerations emerge from the results of
our analysis.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
For “low shame” countries (see Figure 1), revenues increase as t increases. This
behavior explains that revenues grow with t because the reduction of tax revenues
due to (2) is lesser than the positive terms due to the sum of (1) and (3). In detail,
we have that, if a low level of the monitoring parameter q is fixed, there exists a tax
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rate threshold t¯1,q such that E(t, q) is concave for t < t¯1,q and convex otherwise. The
shape of the surface describes this change in concavity more remarkably when a is
small. The growth of tax revenues is faster for high values of the tax rates, since
most populations with low shame do not appreciate the reduction in the tax rate,
if monitoring activity is missing. Thus, the sum between the positive terms due to
(1) and (3) and the negative term due to (2) increases, and t¯1,q can be viewed as a
“relevant tax rate”. When q is big enough, we do not observe a change in the behavior
of the population, which is globally indifferent to the tax rate. The function E(t, q)
does not present changes in concavity, and seems to be linear with respect to t. This
fact describes the evidence that a properly monitored population pays taxes, even if
the individuals have low shame. Therefore, for high monitoring levels, our analysis
does not allow us to distinguish populations with low or high shame effects, and the
tax revenues generally grows with t.
For “high shame” countries (see Figure 2), when the monitoring activity is low, the
tax revenues are bigger those the ones in countries with a low shame effect, as they
evidently should be. Nevertheless, if a small value of q is fixed, there is a tax rate
threshold t¯2,q such that E(t, q) decreases for t > t¯2,q and increases for t < t¯2,q. Hence,
the tax rate t¯2,q is a global maximum of E(t, q) with respect to t. This fact is in
agreement with the evidence that an excessive increase in tax rate implies that a
large part of the population “becomes dishonest”. The effect of (1) and (3) loses
quantitative relevance with respect to the negative terms (2), and the tax revenues
invert their tendency: from growing to falling. If q is fixed at a small enough level,
then t¯2,q is a Laffer-type optimal tax rate, and E(t¯2,q, q) is the Laffer-type optimal
tax revenues that a country can obtain. Also in this case, the phenomenon is more
remarkable when a is small. If q is big enough, as we said above, the behavior of the
tax revenues surface is the same as that in the low shame countries.
For “middle shame” countries, the tax revenues behave analogously to the case of the
high shame countries, but the surface is smoother. The aggregate effect of (1) and
(3) is greater than the reduction effect of (2) for small tax rates.
We proceed now to the analysis of revenues E with respect to the parameter q, by
formalizing the following result11.
Proposition 2.3. Fix t ∈ [0, 1]. If α2 > 1, then E(t, q) is increasing w.r.t. q, for
each t ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2.3 provides a general result: increasing monitoring reduces the potential
surplus that the tax inspector and the entrepreneur can share. Therefore corruption
11See Appendix C for the proof.
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reduces and revenues increase.
3 Policy consideration
In this section we use the results derived above to assess the normative implications
of our model of tax evasion and corruption. The results of our model are certainly
influenced by two important assumptions relating to the behavior of the State.
• No budget constraint is included and, therefore, several very concrete require-
ments have been excluded, regarding those countries which are obliged to adhere
to the agreement for stability and growth and a well-balanced State budget.
• Public expenditure is not productive but is used exclusively for the inspectors’
wages. If this were not so, greater fiscal income might lead to lower accumula-
tion for the entrepreneur, but to higher productive costs for the State. There-
fore, an important issue might be whether private expenditure (entrepreneurs’
investment) is more productive than public spending.
Let us briefly summarize the findings obtained so far. If the tax rate increases, then
tax revenues change, depending on the shame costs. Simultaneously, the corruption
level also grows, because the number of corrupted entrepreneurs increases.
The State could choose to achieve different policy objectives in this context. If the
State is operating over the short term, its goals could be to maximize tax revenues
or eradicate corruption. We have demonstrated that the tax rate influences on the
revenues and the level of corruption. We have, in fact, shown that corruption increases
as the tax rate increases. Therefore, the State could choose to achieve the following
policy objectives: maximize tax revenues or weed out corruption.
As there is no equilibrium which maximizes tax revenues with zero corruption, the
State must choose what, on the basis of its own preferences, is best for society:
• if the State wants to maximize tax revenues, depending on the shame effect
(low or high), it has to set:
(∗) in a low–shame country, a tax rate greater than t¯1,q, because beyond this
value, tax revenues increase - as the tax rate increases - at an increasing
rate;
(∗) in a high–shame country, a tax rate equal to t¯2,q because this value is a
global maximum of E(t, q) with respect to t.
In both cases there is corruption in the economy.
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• if the State wants to weed out corruption, it has to set the tax rate at t = 0.
In this way, there are no incentives for corruption. In such an equilibrium, the
State does not receive revenues. This fact explains the persistence of corruption.
Remark 3.1. Let us extend the model in order to consider an objective prison sen-
tence m for the entrepreneur and the tax inspector, due to tax evasion. We find a
threshold value of tax rate in correspondence of which there is not corruption and the
tax revenues are different from zero. Indeed, the introduction of a prison sentence
reduces the surplus of the entrepreneur of being corrupt. More precisely, the number
of corrupt entrepreneurs becomes:
F (c∗) = 1−
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
−m
)α1]α2
,
and therefore there exists a critical tax rate t◦m =
mq
a(1−q) 6= 0 which weeds out corrup-
tion.
4 Conclusions
The present paper provides a study of the behaviour of fiscal revenues, where there
is evasion and fiscal corruption. In our model, the relationship between the tax rate
and tax revenues depends on the “inner honesty” of society. We demonstrate that a
Laffer-type optimal tax rate exists only in countries with a “high shame” effect: in
this case there is a global maximum of fiscal revenues with respect to the tax rate.
In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues grow as the tax rate does. More
specifically, there is a threshold value for the tax rate where the increasing rate of the
tax revenues begins to reduce.
From a normative point of view, an optimal level of taxation exists both for “high
shame” and “low shame” countries, which permits governments to maximize fiscal
revenues.
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A Appendix: The Nash Bargaining bribe
Let pi∆ = pi4−pi3 = pi(1)∆ , pi(2)∆ be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between the
case of agreement and disagreement between inspector and entrepreneur about the
bribe. In accordance with generalized Nash bargaining theory, the division between
two agents will be solved by the following optimization problem:
max
b∈<+
[pi
(1)
∆ ]
β · [pi(2)∆ ]ε (18)
in formula
max
b∈<+
[ak(1− tq)− cjkq − (1− q)b− ak(1− t)]β [w + (1− q)b− w]ε (19)
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of pi∆ and where [(ak(1−
t)), w] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payoffs that the entrepreneur and the
inspector respectively would obtain if they did not come to an agreement. It is now
easy to check that the tax inspector gets a share µ = ε
ε+β
of the surplus τ , i.e. the
bribe is b = µτ . The surplus τ is the saving which comes from not paying taxes, net
of reputation cost that awaits the entrepreneur if he is found out: τ = akt− qcjk
(1−q) .
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining solution and
is given by:
bNB = µ
[
akt− qkcj
(1− q)
]
(20)
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, ∀q 6= 1.
B Appendix: Solution to the static game
The static game is solved with the backward induction method, which allows us
to identify the equilibria. Starting from stage 2, the entrepreneur needs to decide
whether to negotiate with the inspector. Both payoffs are then compared, because
the inspector asked for a bribe.
Stage II At stage two the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and only if
pi
(1)
4 ≥ pi(1)3 ⇒ (21)[
ak
[
1− t(1 + q)
2
]
− kqcj
2
]
≥ ak(1− t)⇒
t ≥ qcj
a(1− q) = t
∗ (22)
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Stage I Going up the decision-making tree, at stage one the tax inspector decides
whether to ask for a positive bribe or not.
• Let t ≥ qcj
a(1−q) = t
∗ then the tax inspector knows that if he asks for a
positive bribe, the entrepreneur will accept the negotiation, and the final
bribe will be bNB. Then at stage one, the tax inspector asks for a bribe if,
and only if
pi
(2)
4 > pi
(2)
2 ⇒
w +
akt(1− q)
2
− qkcj
2
> w (23)
that is:
t ≥ qcj
a(1− q) = t
∗ (24)
If t ≥ t∗, then the tax inspector will ask for the bribe bNB and the en-
trepreneur will accept.
• Let t < qcj
a(1−q) = t
∗ then the tax inspector knows that the entrepreneurs
will not accept any possible bribe, so he will be honest and he will ask the
entrepreneurs for tax payment.
C Appendix: Tax revenues vs tax rate
The function E admits continuous partial derivative w.r.t. q, and so we have to show
that ∂E(t,q)
∂q
> 0. A simple computation gives
∂E(t, q)
∂q
= (1− δ)atk︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1]α2−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
[
1−
(
at(1− q)
q
)α1 (
1 +
α1α2
q
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
 =
= I1 · {1− I2 · I3}, (25)
and the definition of the I’s reflects the underbrace symbols.
I1 is always greater than 0. If α2 > 1, then I2 ∈ (0, 1); moreover, I3 < 1. Hence, we
have ∂E(t,q)
∂q
> 0.
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